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Abstract 
Based on detailed shipping figures of Suriname’s main harbour in Paramaribo, we 
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 “The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that up to 
1% of medicines available in the developed world is likely to be 
counterfeited. This figure rises to 10% globally, although in 
some developing countries they estimate one third of medicines 
are counterfeit” 
 (Various internet sites consulted January 2010) 
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The diffusion of pharmaceutical products has received some attention in the recent 
marketing literature; see for example Staake et al. (2009). It has been documented that 
the diffusion patterns show various similarities with the diffusion patterns of durable 
consumer goods, see for example Desiraju et al. (2004). As pharmaceutical products 
may experience the impact of regulatory regimes, diffusion patterns may change 
direction and slope due to these regimes, see for example Stremersch and Lemmens 
(2009). In all studies available, there is a strong focus on the diffusion patterns in 
western countries, usually driven by data availability, although Desiraju et al. (2004) 
also include data for various developing countries. A common assumption across all 
studies is that the focus is on the producer of the pharmaceutical products, usually US 
or European companies.  
 In this paper we also address the diffusion patterns of pharmaceutical products 
where we relegate the focus on the actual shipments of such products in a developing 
country. This change of focus then naturally has to include the fact that in developing 
countries many pharmaceutical products are counterfeits. The exact amount of these 
counterfeit drugs is unknown, and therefore we will provide a method to estimate the 
fraction of counterfeit products within a single developing country.  
 Exact data on counterfeit drugs are usually not available, and certainly not in a 
developing country. One way to estimate the size of the counterfeit market is to try to 
disentangle the counterfeit diffusion from the total diffusion, as is proposed in Givon 
et al. (1995) for software products. An alternative would be to estimate it directly 
from the shipments data, if these would be available, see for example Franses and 
Lede (2010). 
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 The focus in the present paper is the diffusion of original and counterfeit 
medical products in the South American country Suriname. Based on detailed data on 
shipments of products in five distinct categories, we estimate the diffusion of original 
and counterfeit products for the sample from 1996 to 2008. With these data, we can 
analyze the correlations between the two diffusion patterns. Also, we examine the 
lead and lag structure across original and counterfeit products. Finally, we estimate 
the total cumulative shipments using the familiar Bass model, and we compare the 
eventual maturity levels for each of the categories. So, in contrast to what the WHO 
documents, we provide estimates of the total amount that in the end will have found 
its way to consumers. We are not interested in the actual figures, but merely in the 
fraction of counterfeit in the total amount.   
The main finding in this paper is that counterfeit drugs and other medical 
products eventually make around 40% of the total shipments in this particular country 
of Suriname. Note that this fraction exceeds the estimates of the WHO. A second 
finding is that the two diffusion processes are correlated contemporaneously, reacting 
similarly to the same outside shocks, but that there is no significant lead or lag 
relationship. This suggests that the original and counterfeit products each address a 
distinct segment of the market.  
 The outline of the paper is as follows. First, in section 2 we describe the data 
collection and the creation of the two series for original and for counterfeit products. 
In Section 3 we analyze the data using basic time series techniques and using familiar 
diffusion models. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their 
implications.  
  
 
2. Data collection 
 
We have collected data for the South American country of Suriname. It is a small and 
open economy, with a single large (maritime) harbour in the capital city of 
Paramaribo. The country has many natural resources. It used to be a colony of the 
Netherlands, before it became independent in 1975. Economic growth slowed down 
since the beginning of the 1980s, but since 2000 there is a steady growth in GDP and 
an increase in welfare. The country is sparsely populated, with most of the citizens 
living in the coastal area. Although average welfare is on the rise, the income 
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inequalities in Suriname are quite large. The country boasts a non-negligible group of 
multi-millionaires, but on the other hand it is estimated that more than 60% of the 
population is below international poverty levels.  
 Sales records for medical products do not exist.  Hence, we have to estimate 
the diffusion patterns of these products using alternative methods. We consulted 
Statistics Suriname and we were able to collect annual data on the imports of products 
in five categories for the period 1996 to and including 2008. The product categories 
are Pharmaceutical items, Medicine, for sale small scale, Medicine, not for sale small 
scale, Wound-covering materials and Blood items. These imports are measured in 
kilograms and in total value (in US dollars). We decided to take the weights as the 
measurement unit to avoid correction for inflation in the exporting countries. Crucial 
for our purposes is that we have information on the countries of origin of the 
shipments. In Appendix A, we give the countries of origin, and we indicate from 
which countries which products in the five categories, originate. Clearly, Suriname 
imports from a long list of countries, and there is also variation across the categories. 
 To estimate the shipments of original products and counterfeit products, we 
use the software piracy index, which can be obtained from www.nationmaster.com. 
This website presents a list of countries and gives an estimate of the fraction of 
products (here: computer software) that are most likely counterfeit. In Appendix B we 
provide a list of relevant countries for our product categories and the corresponding 
percentages. Like this list, we shall take it as likely that 23% of the pharmaceutical 
products that are imported from Japan amount to counterfeit products, and that it is as 
much as 82% of these products originating from China that are counterfeits. Of 
course, we shall never be certain whether these percentages also hold for our product 
categories, nor if this figure changes over time or amounts to a biased estimate, and 
hence the subsequent data should not be considered as exact amounts, but merely as 
estimates. That is, the absolute numbers do not matter, but their time series properties 
do. In order to allow the reader to verify the computations about which we report in 
the next section, we present our data in Appendix C. Graphical details and other 
aspects of these series will be discussed in the next section. 
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3. Analysis of shipments data 
 
This section deals with the statistical analysis of the two diffusion series. We analyze 
the levels of the shipments, as in Appendix C, and the cumulated shipments. The 
latter are used to estimate the eventual total size of the market. The first pairs of series 
are analyzed to see if there are leading or lagging diffusion processes amongst the two 
series. We discuss the methodology, first for cumulative shipments and then for 
shipments themselves, and we discuss the results in each of the five categories.   
 
Methodology for cumulative shipments 
 
We denote the level of the original products shipments as tO  and the level of the 
shipments of counterfeits as tC  where 2008,...,1997,1996t . The data appear in the 
Appendix C. We also compute the cumulative shipments, and label these as 
tCO and tCC . Graphs of the series for the five categories appear in Figures 1 to 5. The 
second panel of each of these Figures suggests that the cumulative shipments obey a 
product life cycle that can also be observed in the diffusion of durable products. 
Hence, the first part of our methodology involves considering diffusion models to 
estimate the inflection points and the ultimate maturity levels of these cumulative 
series. 
 
Insert Figures 1 to 5 about here 
  
 For the tCO and tCC  variables, we consider the familiar Bass model (Bass, 
1969), which in our notation can be written in regression format as 
 
(1)  tt
o
o
toooot COm
q
COpqmpO   2 11)(  
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c
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q
CCpqmpC   2 11)(  
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for originals and counterfeits, respectively. The parameters p and q characterize the 
shape of the diffusion pattern, and determine the location of the inflection point I  
which can be calculated as 
 
(3)  )log(1 p
q
qp
I   
 
The parameters in the Bass model may be difficult to estimate in case the data do not 
yet include the inflection point. If this happens, we replace the Bass model by the 
symmetric logistic curve, given by 
 
(4)  
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for originals and counterfeits, respectively. Here the parameter   characterizes the 
shape of the curve, and again I corresponds with the timing of the inflection point. 
Due to the imposed symmetric nature of the logistic curve, one can still adequately 
estimate the location of the inflection point, even when it is not included in the 
sample. The estimation routine is Nonlinear Least Squares. In both cases, that is the 
Bass model and the logistic curve, our interest lies in the parameters m , the ultimate 
level of total shipments, and I , the location of the inflection point.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 In Table 1 we present the present the estimates of the maturity level. We also 
compute the fraction of cm over co mm  . As said, this latter fraction is most relevant 
for our purposes. Table 1 suggests that it can range from about 0.3 to 0.5, with an 
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average close to 0.4. In words, about 40% of the eventual total shipments in medical 
products in Suriname concerns counterfeit products. It is interesting to see that the 
variation of the estimate of the fraction across the five product categories is quite 
small. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 Table 2 gives the estimates of the inflection points. For two of the five 
categories the years with these points coincide. For Medicine, not for sale small scale, 
the inflection point of counterfeits occurred earlier, suggesting that the maturity level 
for this series is attained earlier than for the original products. For two categories the 
counterfeit series peak later, with for Blood Items meaning that in the next few years 
still a substantial amount of counterfeit products will be imported in Suriname, at 
least, if the current situations persists.  
  
Methodology for shipments 
 
The graphs in Figures 1 to 5 seem to suggest that shipments of original and of 
counterfeit products show similar diffusion patterns. It is of interest to see if one of 
the two series is leading (or lagging). Indeed, in Franses and Lede (2010) it was 
documented that original products’ diffusions lead that of counterfeits.  
 To examine leads and lags relations, we estimate a vector autoregression of 
order 1 (VAR(1)), which consists of the following two equations 
 
(6)  ttttt COCO    111111  
  
and 
 
(7)  ttttt COOC    121222  
 
Note that a genuine VAR(1) model would not include current tC and tO , but here it 
allows for a partial correction for current effects. The test of interest concerns the joint 
significance of 11, in (6) and of 22 , in (7).  
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Insert Table 3 about here 
  
In Table 3 we present the p values of the F tests. Except for the category 
Medicine, not for sale small scale, we find that these parameters are not significantly 
different from zero. For the exceptional category, we learn that lagged shipments of 
originals leads current shipments of originals. So, in sum, there is no leading or 
lagging variable across originals and counterfeits.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 Table 4 gives the contemporaneous correlation between the two series, and it 
is quite evident that this correlation is high.  
 In sum, we find that original and counterfeit medical products follow similar 
diffusion patterns and that no series is leading or lagging the other. When it is 
assumed that all individuals in Suriname are equally likely to need medical products, 
our findings suggest that the shipments address two distinct segments of consumers.  
There is demand for original products and there is demand for counterfeit products, 
with the demand for originals in the end being 1.5 times as large as demand for 
counterfeits, as the fraction of counterfeits in the total shipments is 40%.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In addition to the available global estimates of the WHO, we provide detailed 
estimates of shipments of original and counterfeit medical products in the South 
American country of Suriname. The numbers of these estimates are not particularly 
relevant, as we are interested in the relative numbers and the current and dynamic 
correlations across the two series. When we analyze the diffusion patterns, we see that 
total shipments (to be observed many years from now) will cover about 40% 
counterfeits. Moreover, we see that current correlation is high, and that there are no 
relevant leads or lags. Hence, the two types of shipments seem to address two distinct 
clusters of consumers.  
 In Franses and Lede (2010) it was documented that for shipments of durable 
products like televisions, mobile phones and DVDs slightly different results appeared, 
but the notion of having two clusters of consumers was also addressed in that study. A 
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first and immediate conclusion that one could draw is that original products would 
find their way to a richer set of consumers, while the counterfeit products would be 
targeted at the poorer part of the country. This conclusion could be plausible at first 
sight, but needs much more refined analysis. This conclusion would assume that all 
consumers are similarly in need for medical products. It could however very well be 
that poorer inhabitants of Suriname are less often ill than richer inhabitants are. 
Similarly, why would poorer individuals have the same demand for products like 
DVDs and for certain specific medical products? More research on this issue is 
clearly needed.  
 
5. Policy implications 
 
For Suriname we emphasize that the battle against counterfeit pharmaceutical 
products is one that asks much effort on the part of the Surinamese government. As a 
member of the WHO, this country needs to make greater effort to adopt the WHO 
schemes and to make more use of the information, instructions, and opportunities 
presented by this organization’s global coalition of stakeholders, that is, the 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT). The 
Surinamese government needs to tighten the relevant legislation and regulations so 
that substantial fines and even more appropriate prison sentences can be declared 
against those persons and organizations who engage in the import and sale of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 
 Furthermore, the Surinamese government needs to raise the awareness of the 
citizens. The majority of the citizens have no background information on the 
pharmaceutical products they use, let alone on how to detect counterfeit versions 
among the original pharmaceuticals. Of course, not all original pharmaceuticals are as 
simple to distinguish from counterfeits, as others. However, there are counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals which people can detect with little effort. Government must take the 
leading role in empowering the citizens by adequately informing them about how to 
determine the originality of pharmaceuticals. Surinamese government must also 
inform the inhabitants about the fatal consequences of counterfeit versions of 
pharmaceutical products, and thus the great health risks these products may inflict on 
those who use them. This tightening of the government’s policy in the battle against 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals is very likely to result in a significant reduction of the 
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trade in these products in Suriname, and hence reduce the risk of exposure to the 
dangers of these products. Moreover, not only legislation and regulation policy needs 
to be tightened, but also the policy regarding control and the effective implementation 
thereof, needs to be taken into account.  
 Additional to the Surinamese government, there are at least three stakeholders 
that can also play a role in this battle. The first stakeholder is customs. Since it is 
suspected that large portions of counterfeit pharmaceuticals are smuggled into the 
country, this stakeholder will need to improve its control concerning the import of 
these products. Stricter control, combined with tight legislation and regulation will 
enable the custom officials to increasingly contribute to reducing the import of and 
the trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 
 The second stakeholder, that is, the Pharmaceutical Inspection, the control 
mechanism of the Surinamese government with regard to the pharmaceutical 
products, is responsible to inspect and control the pharmaceutical market. This 
department is supported by the Office for Pharmaceutical Supply in Suriname. The 
latter focuses on the quality controls of locally produced and imported drugs. The 
Pharmaceutical Inspection, small in size, may lack the capability to optimally inspect 
and control the pharmaceutical business in Suriname. We suggest that the government 
increases its support to these organizations. 
 The final stakeholder is the consumer. As the citizens (but also hospitals and 
similar institutions) ultimately determine the extent to which the sale of products 
increase or decrease, this stakeholder also needs to participate in reducing the trade in 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals in Suriname. Of course, before customers are able to 
consciously choose to purchase and use original pharmaceutical products, first and 
foremost they will need to be adequately informed about the disadvantages of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, they will need to be informed about how to 
detect the counterfeit pharmaceuticals from the original versions. 
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Appendix A: Import from countries 
      Product Category 
   A  B  C  D  E 
Countries 
Antigua      x  x 
Dutch Antilles  x    x  x  x 
Aruba         x 
Australia  x    x 
Austria      x  x 
Bahamas  x 
Barbados  x  x  x 
Belgium  x  x  x  x  x 
Brazil   x  x  x    x 
Canada  x  x  x  x  x 
China   x  x  x  x  x 
Colombia  x    x  x 
Costa Rica  x    x 
Cyprus   x    x 
Denmark  x    x    x 
Egypt       x 
El Salvador      x 
United Emirates       x 
French Guyana x  x    x  x 
France   x  x  x  x  x 
Germany  x  x  x  x  
Greece       x 
Guatemala  x    x 
Guyana  x    x  x 
Hungary          x 
India     x  x  x 
Indonesia    x  x  x 
Israel       x 
Ireland   x  x 
Italy           x 
Jamaica  x        x 
Japan   x    x  x 
South Korea  x  x  x  x  x 
St Lucia  x  
Mexico      x    x 
Namibia  x 
Netherlands  x  x  x  x  x 
New Zealand      x    x 
Niger   x  
Norway          x 
Panama  x  x  x  x   
Portugal  x      x 
Puerto Rico  x  x  x  x 
Russia       x 
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Appendix A (Continued): Import from countries 
 
 
 
San Marino      x 
South Africa  x 
Spain    x 
Sweden  x    x 
Switzerland  x  x    x  x 
Taiwan      x  x  
Thailand    x  x  x  x 
Trinidad and Tobago x  x  x  x 
United Kingdom x  x  x  x 
United States  x  x  x  x  x 
Venezuela  x 
 
 
(A) Pharmaceutical items, (B) Medicine, for sale small scale, (C) Medicine, not for 
sale small scale, (D) Wound covering materials and (E) Blood items   
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Appendix B: Percentage of products that is counterfeit (based on the software 
piracy rate, www.nationmaster.com, consulted December 2009) 
 
Antigua  50   Dutch Antilles  50   
Aruba   50   Australia  28 
Austria  25   Bahamas  50 
Barbados  50   Belgium  25 
Brazil   59   Canada  33 
China   82   Colombia  58 
Costa Rica  61   Cyprus   50 
Denmark  25   Egypt   60   
El Salvador  81   United Emirates 35  
French Guyana 42   France   42 
Germany  27   Greece   58   
Guatemala  80   Guyana  50 
Hungary  42   India   69   
Indonesia  84   Israel   32   
Ireland   34   Italy   49   
Jamaica  50   Japan   23 
South Korea  43   St Lucia  50  
Mexico  61   Namibia  50 
Netherlands  28   New Zealand  22  
Niger   50   Norway  29   
Panama  74   Portugal  43 
Puerto Rico  44   Russia   73   
San Marino  50   South Africa  34 
Spain    43   Sweden  25 
Switzerland  25   Taiwan  40   
Thailand  78   Trinidad and Tobago 50 
United Kingdom 26   United States  20 
Venezuela  87 
 
Note: When a country does not appear on the list, we use the score 50.  
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Appendix C: The data 
 
Table C1: Shipments of original and counterfeit products: Pharmaceutical items, 
general (in kilograms) 
 
Year     Original  Counterfeit 
1996 6984.570 2437.430 
1997 6726.670 2404.330 
1998 52109.53 19346.47 
1999 79784.10 29644.90 
2000 102338.1 40856.93 
2001 22542.07 8584.930 
2002 75868.91 20278.09 
2003 12747.33 5462.670 
2004 12117.31 7397.690 
2005 8025.620 2938.380 
2006 8639.090 3554.910 
2007 15909.47 6238.530 
2008 15565.72 10033.28 
 
 
 
Table C2: Shipments of original and counterfeit products: Medicine, for sale small 
scale (in kilograms) 
 
Year     Original  Counterfeit 
1996 7140.120 3402.880 
1997 3721.980 1606.020 
1998 1631.590 673.4100 
1999 2360.470 818.5300 
2000 25662.14 9946.860 
2001 55775.76 16261.24 
2002 27512.91 9549.090 
2003 22004.05 7445.950 
2004 16083.69 6314.310 
2005 30502.89 17907.11 
2006 43727.94 24332.06 
2007 120884.8 164090.2 
2008 56326.23 32061.77 
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Table C3: Shipments of original and counterfeit products: Medicine, not for sale small 
scale (in kilograms) 
 
Year     Original  Counterfeit 
1996 82410.42 34027.58 
1997 126437.3 53107.74 
1998 87937.55 42676.45 
1999 66519.33 45686.67 
2000 129504.3 70367.69 
2001 91668.09 48919.91 
2002 88133.77 42033.23 
2003 237083.1 105841.9 
2004 176400.2 101030.8 
2005 413139.4 479416.6 
2006 284124.9 200984.2 
2007 278071.7 127044.3 
2008 302822.2 141556.8 
 
 
 
 
Table C4: Shipments of original and counterfeit products: Wound covering materials 
(in kilograms) 
 
Year     Original  Counterfeit 
1996 21680.89 11375.11 
1997 25731.19 26771.81 
1998 18485.60 8128.400 
1999 10025.28 6677.720 
2000 23374.10 10868.90 
2001 28716.47 17209.53 
2002 20663.89 14954.11 
2003 45351.56 23804.44 
2004 48713.34 23512.66 
2005 33667.00 16122.00 
2006 44422.59 22254.41 
2007 33909.00 21029.00 
2008 52893.00 38540.00 
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Table C5: Shipments of original and counterfeit products: Blood items (in kilograms) 
 
Year     Original  Counterfeit 
1996 1007.850 364.1500 
1997 12778.71 11796.29 
1998 6391.800 2106.200 
1999 2160.360 838.6400 
2000 3251.140 1259.860 
2001 3112.780 1131.220 
2002 731.4600 370.5400 
2003 5704.680 3990.320 
2004 16571.03 6558.970 
2005 8564.730 3352.270 
2006 1759.190 777.8100 
2007 2634.270 1126.730 
2008 45435.90 17764.10 
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Figure 1: Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and counterfeit products: 
Pharmaceutical items 
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Figure 2: Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and counterfeit products: 
Medicine, for sale small scale 
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Figure 3: Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and counterfeit products: 
Medicine, not for sale small scale 
 
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
ORIGINAL COUNTERFEIT
 
0
400,000
800,000
1,200,000
1,600,000
2,000,000
2,400,000
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
CUMORIGINAL CUMCOUNTERFEIT
 
 
 
 20
Figure 4: Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and counterfeit products: 
Wound covering materials 
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Figure 5: Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and counterfeit products: 
Blood items 
 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
ORIGINAL COUNTERFEIT
 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
CUMORIGINAL CUMCOUNTERFEIT
 
 
 
 22
Table 1:  
Fraction of counterfeit shipments over total shipments, based on estimates of the 
eventual maturity level  
 
 
Variable     Estimated Maturity Level 
      Original Counterfeit Fraction 
 
(A) Pharmaceutical items   396066 148209 0.272 
(B) Medicine, for sale small scale  1283915 1262614 0.496 
(C) Medicine, not for sale small scale 4463491 2128846 0.323 
(D) Wound-covering materials  582769 386618 0.399 
(E) Blood items    372778 267351 0.418 
 
Average         0.382 
 
Note: The Bass model is used for (A), while the logistic model is used for (B), (C), 
(D) and (E).  
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Table 2:  
Estimated inflection points for original and counterfeit shipments 
 
Variable      Estimated Inflection Point 
       Original Counterfeit  
 
(A) Pharmaceutical items    1999  1999 
(B) Medicine, for sale small scale   2010  2010 
(C) Medicine, not for sale small scale  2008  2006 
(D) Wound-covering materials   2005  2006 
(E) Blood items     2013  2018 
 
Note: The Bass model is used for (A), while the logistic model is used for (B), (C), 
(D) and (E).  
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Table 3:  
P-values of the F-test for the joint relevance of one-year lagged shipments of original 
products and one-year lagged shipments of counterfeit products (Each equation 
contains an intercept and current sales of the other variable)  
 
      Dependent variable 
      Original  Counterfeit 
Variable 
 
Pharmaceutical items    0.933   0.806 
Medicine, for sale small scale   0.119   0.382 
Medicine, not for sale small scale  0.038   0.325  
Wound covering materials   0.389   0.840 
Blood items     0.653   0.529 
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Table 4:  
Correlation between shipments of original products and of counterfeit products 
       
Variable    
 
Pharmaceutical items      0.973   
Medicine, for sale small scale     0.914  
Medicine, not for sale small scale    0.871 
Wound covering materials     0.835 
Blood items       0.932 
 
Average       0.905 
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